



## Libya Update – May 31, 2011

### Situation as of May 31, 2011

Nearly 11 weeks of U.S and NATO-led airstrikes have inflicted serious damage upon Qaddafi's war machine and helped opposition forces, now known as the National Liberation Army, to gain the initiative. Misratah, the site of the heaviest fighting since the conflict began, is now under the control of opposition forces. With control of the air and sea ports, rebels can reinforce Misratah from the east while simultaneously supporting resistance in the west. Rebel combat skills have improved, as has their arsenal. Fuel shortages in regime-held areas are taking a toll. Combat effectiveness among loyalist forces is eroding, high-level defections are increasing, and Qaddafi reportedly is taking refuge in hospitals in order to evade NATO strikes. On May 26<sup>th</sup>, the Libyan Prime Minister renewed calls for a ceasefire and on May 30<sup>th</sup>, South African President Jacob Zuma met with Qaddafi in Tripoli to press for implementation of a political roadmap proposed by the African Union.

Still, fierce fighting continues across the Nafusa mountain range, which cuts across the desert south of Tripoli to the western border with Tunisia. Loyalist forces have cut power to rebel-held areas in the mountains and water is becoming scarce. Fighting has spilled across the Tunisian border, heightening concerns about regional security. The ability of opposition forces to take and hold territory absent NATO intervention is questionable.

Intensified NATO strikes over the past two weeks have targeted major command-and-control infrastructure in Tripoli and Brega, as well as surface-to-air missile launchers in Sirte and Al Khums. Direct lines of communication have been established between NATO and opposition headquarters in Benghazi, thus enhancing NATO's operational effectiveness. Previously, opposition forces faced accidental strikes by NATO aircraft after failing to identify themselves and shifting to the use of armored vehicles without communicating with the coalition. As of May 31<sup>st</sup>, the NATO air mission has conducted nearly 9000 sorties, including 3400 strike sorties, since assuming control of the operation on March 23rd. The NATO maritime component has conducted nearly 1100 hailings in the embargo area, boarded 60 ships, and turned away 7 ships.

However, tensions among NATO allies are increasing. The ability to sustain the current operational tempo is uncertain and some partners (notably Norway) already have signaled their intent to drawdown over the coming weeks. The French and the British appear to be banking on the commitment of attack helicopters to conduct pinpoint urban strikes.

***Humanitarian Situation:*** The United States has provided over \$53.5 million to meet urgent humanitarian needs in Libya while the European Commission has provided nearly \$55.4 million. On May 18<sup>th</sup> the UN launched a revised Regional Flash Appeal for the Libyan Crisis, increasing the appeal to \$407.8 million. To date, the UN has received \$175 million in contributions or 43%

toward the appeal and an additional \$106 million for humanitarian activities not listed in the appeal. The UN evacuated its international staff from Tripoli on May 1st but maintains a presence in Benghazi. Humanitarian access inside Libya remains severely constrained. Of particular concern are the besieged western towns of Zintan, Nalut, Zawiyah and Yifran.

Over 807,000 people have fled to neighboring Chad, Egypt, Niger, Algeria and Tunisia since the start of the crisis. Additionally, up to 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Brega, Ras Lanuf, and Ajdabiya are in eastern Libya.

***Diplomatic Pressure:*** On May 30<sup>th</sup> Qaddafi's military capacity was further degraded by a new round of defections, this time including eight senior military officers. On May 20<sup>th</sup> it was reported that Shukri Ghanem, head of Libya's National Oil Company and former Prime Minister, had defected to Tunisia. On May 19<sup>th</sup> Secretary of State Clinton asserted that Qaddafi's wife Sophia and daughter Aicha had fled to Tunisia, though Tunisian authorities later denied the report. On May 9<sup>th</sup> it was reported that Egyptian authorities had placed Qaddafi's cousin Ahmed Gaddaf al-Dam under house and planned to seize his assets before deporting him to Benghazi. On May 4<sup>th</sup> the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court announced that he was seeking the arrest of three unnamed senior officials in the Libyan regime for war crimes and crimes against humanity. On May 3<sup>rd</sup> Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan demanded that Qaddafi step down after attacks against foreign embassies in Tripoli forced Turkey to suspend diplomatic operations. Libyan diplomats subsequently were expelled from France and the UK. On May 2<sup>nd</sup> Switzerland reported that the country had seized over \$411 million in Libyan assets. The United States, the European Union, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and other countries previously enacted targeted sanctions against Qaddafi and his key supporters.

## **Background**

Against the backdrop of popular protests in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, Libyan opposition figures organized a "Day of Rage" to protest over 41 years of authoritarian rule by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi on February 17, 2011. However, localized violence in the eastern cities of Benghazi and Bayda erupted on February 15<sup>th</sup>, when authorities used force to subdue small protests relating to a previous crackdown. Events quickly spiraled out of control as security forces opened fire with heavy weapons, opposition forces overran security facilities, and protests spread to other regions. Bolstered by the seizure of military equipment and defections by key government and military figures, opposition forces made rapid gains. Between March 10<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup>, Qaddafi's loyalist forces launched a brutal counter-offensive characterized by indiscriminate attacks on civilians, heavy artillery fire and airstrikes. By March 17<sup>th</sup> loyalist forces were poised to take Benghazi, the main opposition stronghold. Qaddafi warned that he was prepared to sweep through Benghazi house-by-house and would show "no mercy".

***International Response:*** On February 22<sup>nd</sup> the **Arab League** suspended Libya's membership and on March 12<sup>th</sup> endorsed a request to the United Nations to impose a no-fly zone. On February 23<sup>rd</sup> the **African Union** condemned the use of violence against civilians and convened a high-level committee to facilitate political dialogue. On February 26<sup>th</sup> the **UN Security Council** unanimously approved UNSCR 1970, establishing an arms embargo, imposing targeted travel and financial sanctions against Qaddafi and certain family members and supporters, and

referring the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). On February 28<sup>th</sup> the **European Union** announced an arms embargo and targeted sanctions in line with UNSCR 1970. On March 1<sup>st</sup> the UN General Assembly voted to suspend Libya from the **UN Human Rights Council**. On March 10<sup>th</sup> **Russia** announced it would cancel all pending arms sales to Libya and support enforcement of the arms embargo. Also on March 10<sup>th</sup>, NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced the intent to deploy additional **NATO** maritime assets monitor the arms embargo, and facilitate deliveries of humanitarian assistance.

**U.S. Response:** President Obama made his first statement on Libya on February 23<sup>rd</sup>, characterizing the bloodshed as “outrageous” and “unacceptable,” and asserting that the Administration was considering a “full range of options” to respond to the crisis. On February 25<sup>th</sup> he suspended U.S. diplomatic operations in Libya and issued Executive Order 13566, declaring a national emergency with respect to the situation in Libya, imposing targeted sanctions against the Central Bank, Qaddafi and a few associates, and freezing over \$36 billion in Libyan assets. On March 3<sup>rd</sup> he called on Qaddafi to step down.

**UN Security Council Resolution 1973:** Following the Arab League’s March 12<sup>th</sup> endorsement of a no-fly zone and under intense pressure to stop the bloodletting in Benghazi, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on March 17<sup>th</sup> by a vote of 10-0, with five abstentions (China, Russia, Brazil, Germany, and India). The resolution demanded an immediate ceasefire; established a no-fly zone over Libya; authorized “all necessary measures” (with the exception of ground forces) to protect civilians and enforce the no-fly zone; authorized robust procedures to enforce the arms embargo; and expanded targeted sanctions. Upon adoption of UNSCR 1973, President Obama stated:

*The United States is prepared to act as part of an international coalition ... We will provide the unique capabilities that we can bring to bear to stop the violence against civilians, including enabling our European allies and Arab partners to effectively enforce a no fly zone ... The United States is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go beyond a well defined goal – specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya.*

**Operation Odyssey Dawn/Operation Unified Protector:** On March 19<sup>th</sup>, the President authorized airstrikes against Libya, targeting Libyan air defense systems and airfields “for the purposes of preparing a no-fly zone.” On March 21, 2011, the President sent a letter to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, stating:

*... United States forces are conducting a limited and well-defined mission in support of international efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster ... We will seek a rapid, but responsible, transition of operations to coalition, regional, or international organizations that are postured to continue activities as may be necessary to realize the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. For these purposes, I have directed these actions, which are in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution.*

The President wrote that he was “providing this report...consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” which requires the President to report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. forces into certain situations where there has been no declaration of war.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen confirmed that NATO would take over enforcement of the no-fly zone and arms embargo on March 24<sup>th</sup>. NATO assumed control of all military operations in Libya under the command of Lt. General Charles Bouchard on March 27<sup>th</sup>, under the auspices of Operation Unified Protector.

In his first address to the American public on March 28<sup>th</sup>, President Obama stated:

*[T]onight, I can report that we have stopped Gaddafi’s deadly advance ... Going forward, the lead in enforcing the No Fly Zone and protecting civilians on the ground will transition to our allies and partners ... As the bulk of our military effort ratchets down, what we can do – and will do – is support the aspirations of the Libyan people. We have intervened to stop a massacre, and we will work with our allies and partners as they’re in the lead to maintain the safety of civilians. We will deny the regime arms, cut off its supply of cash, assist the opposition, and work with other nations to hasten the day when Gaddafi leaves power.*

On May 20<sup>th</sup>, the President wrote to the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, expressing support for a resolution that would:

*“confirm that the United States supports the U.S. mission in Libya and that both branches are united in the commitment to supporting the aspirations of the Libyan people for political reform and self-government ... Such a Resolution is also important in the context of our constitutional framework, as it would demonstrate a unity of purpose among the political branches on this important national security matter. It has always been my view that it is better to take military action, even in limited actions such as this, with Congressional engagement, consultation, and support.”*

Though it does not mention the fact, the letter was delivered on the 60<sup>th</sup> day following the President’s report to Congress on the commencement of military operations in Libya. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) requires the President to terminate the use of U.S. forces within 60 days, unless Congress acts either to declare war, to authorize that use of force, or to extend the 60-day period. On May 23<sup>rd</sup>, Senators McCain, Chambliss, Feinstein, Graham, Kerry, Levin, and Lieberman introduced S. Res. 194, which expresses the Sense of the Senate in support of “the limited use of military force by the United States in Libya,” and calls on the President to submit to Congress a description of U.S. policy objectives in Libya and a detailed plan to achieve them. Although that Senate resolution expresses support, it does not formally authorize the use of force pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.

***Assistance to the Transitional National Council:*** During a meeting of the Libya Contact Group on May 5, 2011, members agreed to create a Temporary Financial Mechanism (TFM) through which humanitarian and other financial assistance would flow to rebel-controlled areas. The TEM will be administered by a steering committee of three Libyans chosen by the Transitional

National Council (TNC), a representative of Qatar, and a representative from Italy or France on a six-month rotating basis. The TNC was seeking \$3 billion and warned that they were running “perilously” short of money to buy food, medicine, and gasoline, and to pay government salaries in the areas they control.

The United States already has authorized a drawdown in nonlethal defense articles and services valued at \$25 million to assist the TNC and an additional \$53.5 million in humanitarian assistance. Sanctions also have been modified to allow U.S. companies to purchase oil from the TNC. The Administration now is seeking legislation to allow them to “vest,” or confiscate, “assets and property held by the government of Libya, including the Central Bank of Libya, in the jurisdiction of the United States and invest all or part of that in any agency or individual designated by the President to provide humanitarian relief and protect civilians in Libya.” The United States currently holds over \$36 billion in frozen Libyan assets and property, of which \$150 million has been proposed for vesting. Senator Kerry has suggested to reporters that he will soon introduce the requested legislation.

**The Interim Transitional National Council:** Questions continue to be raised about who the opposition is and what their ultimate objectives might be, beyond removing Qaddafi from power. The Interim Transitional National Council (TNC) is an opposition coalition formed to represent Libyans from its base in Benghazi. The extent of the group’s domestic political legitimacy and authority is unclear, although its stated aspirations and appeals are addressed to all Libyans and appear consistent with American values. The TNC claims many of the local and regional citizen councils that formed across Libya in the wake of the uprising have endorsed the Council and its agenda. However, limited information is available about the TNC’s relationships with emergent opposition leaders, particularly in western Libya, whose identities TNC leaders have claimed need to remain secret for their protection. France, Italy, Qatar, Kuwait, Senegal, and the Maldives have formally recognized the TNC as the legitimate diplomatic representative of the Libyan people.

Qaddafi and his supporters have accused his opponents, including the TNC, of having an eastern regional separatist agenda and of serving as a front for Al Qaeda. The TNC has denied these accusations, stressing its broad nationalist orientation and denying formal connections to religious militants, while acknowledging that some Islamists, including former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members, are involved in military operations against pro-Qaddafi forces. Some opposition supporters, including the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, have indicated they will not support the participation of former government officials in any future transitional political arrangement, although their positions could change or have little effect on political outcomes

## **War Powers in General**

The history of our nation has been marked by a complex and unresolved tension between the roles of the Executive and Legislative branches in committing U.S. armed forces to conflict. The Constitution itself divides war powers, giving Congress the power to declare war and to raise and support the armed forces (Art. I, Sec. 8), while making the President the Commander in Chief of the armed forces (Art. II, Sec. 2).

Supporters of strong Congressional authority tend to claim that the Framers intended to give Congress the ultimate authority to decide whether or not to enter a war. In this view, the President, as Commander in Chief, can lead U.S. forces once a war declaration has been made, can use them to defend the nation against attack, and can perhaps take other actions (such as rescuing U.S. citizens), but cannot commit our armed forces to war.

Supporters of strong Executive authority tend to emphasize the need for broad “Commander-in-Chief” powers, and view Congress’s power to “declare war” as the power to formally recognize that a state of war already exists, rather than to commence military action. They argue that the proper, Constitutional vehicle for Congress to forbid or terminate U.S. military action is by statute, such as a cutoff of appropriations for military operations.

## **The War Powers Resolution**

Prompted by concerns over the erosion of its authority in light of the experiences of Korea and Vietnam, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) in 1973, over the veto of President Nixon. According to the terms of the War Powers Resolution (WPR), the President should introduce U.S. forces into actual or imminent hostilities only pursuant to: (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by an attack on the United States or its armed forces. The WPR requires the President to consult with Congress “in every possible instance...before introducing United States Forces into hostilities” or situations of imminent hostilities.

The WPR also requires the President to report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. forces into certain situations where there has been no declaration of war. These situations include the introduction of U.S. forces “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” (section 4(a)(1)), or “into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat” (section 4(a)(2)). The WPR requires the President to terminate that use of U.S. forces within 60 days after a 4(a)(1) report, unless Congress acts (via expedited procedures outlined in the WPR) either to declare war, to authorize that use of force, or to extend the 60-day period. The President can extend the period by up to an additional 30 days by certifying to Congress that the time is required by “unavoidable military necessity,” in order to safely remove U.S. forces.

In addition, the WPR states that, in the absence of a declaration of War or statutory authorization, the Congress may direct the President to remove U.S. forces from engagement in foreign hostilities by concurrent resolution. A later statute provided a similar disapproval

mechanism using a joint resolution (which is presented to the President for signature or veto), in an attempt to avoid potential Constitutional problems.<sup>1</sup>

Since its enactment, every President has taken the position that the Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement on his authority as Commander in Chief. The two biggest complaints have focused on:

1. The 60-day time limit triggered by 4(a)(1), which allows Congressional *inaction* (i.e., failure to pass authorizing legislation) to limit the powers of the President, and
2. The legislative veto provision noted above, which purports to grant Congress the power to require troop withdrawal by passage of a concurrent resolution.

The courts have so far avoided deciding the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.

Although Presidents have reported deployments to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” over 120 times (most recently on March 21, regarding Libya), they have consistently avoided citing section 4(a)(1), to avoid triggering the 60-day limitation. Presidents also have deployed U.S. troops without the advance consultation arguably required by the WPR, such as in the case of the attempted Iran hostage rescue by President Carter. Presidents also have deployed troops into hostilities on several occasions – such as in Grenada, Yugoslavia, and Haiti – in the absence of a declaration of war, a statutory authorization, or an attack on the United States.

Some would argue that, in other instances, the existence of the WPR has had a constraining effect on the Executive, and has provoked *some* consultation and reporting, even if imperfect. In multiple cases, both sides have avoided forcing the Constitutional issue, arriving instead at a practical *détente* (such as when Congress passed a statute limiting funding for U.S. troops in Somalia to the March 31, 1994 date, which President Clinton had already announced for troop withdrawal).<sup>2</sup>

Some experts note that, as a practical matter, the insistence of Members of Congress on strict enforcement of the WPR is frequently shaped by their views of the merits of the particular military engagement in question, which may shift over time and in response to public opinion. More cynical commentators have quipped that Congress opposes wars only in hindsight.

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<sup>1</sup> *INS v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) cast doubt on the Constitutional validity of any legislative veto device that is not presented to the President for signature. Thus, a Senate amendment to the FY84 State Department Authorization Act (codified at 50 USC 1544(c)) changed the vehicle to a joint resolution.

<sup>2</sup> Section 8151 of P.L. 103-139 (FY 1994 Department of Defense Appropriations Act).

## **Oversight by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs**

The Committee's attention to Libya predated the March 19, 2011 deployment of U.S. forces there, and certainly has continued since that time.

Prompted by political developments inside Libya in February, the Committee requested and received a staff briefing by the Central Intelligence Agency on Libya and other Middle East/North African flashpoints on February 25, 2011.

On February 28, 2011, Committee staff participated in the first of continuing, weekly interagency conference call briefings on the democracy, conflict, humanitarian, and refugee situations in the region.

Three days after U.S. forces engaged inside Libya, on March 22, 2011, and following Committee requests, the National Security Council, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense briefed designated House and Senate Leadership and Committee staff.

On Wednesday, March 30, 2011, a House-wide, classified briefing on U.S. involvement in Libya by Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, and other Administration officials was held for all interested House Members.

On Thursday, March 31, 2011, the full Committee held a hearing on "Libya: Defining U.S. National Security Interests" where Members probed in detail the justifications, scope, and objectives of U.S. intervention in Libya with Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg.

On April 1, 2011, the Foreign Affairs Committee held a Members' Ambassadorial roundtable on developments in Libya, Egypt, and Iran.

On April 7, 2011, the full Committee held a hearing on the United Nations with Ambassador Susan Rice, which included discussion of the UN-sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya.

Also on April 7, telephone pre-consultations regarding the President's intent to exercise drawdown authority to provide non-lethal assistance in Libya prompted a Committee request for a classified briefing.

On April 13, 2011, the Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia held a hearing on "Shifting Sands: Political Transitions in the Middle East, Part I" that addressed the situation in Libya with a panel of private experts.

On April 15, 2011, the Committee received a memorandum of justification for the President's proposed drawdown to protect civilian-populated areas under attack in Libya, and held a classified briefing on that subject on April 19, 2011.

On April 26, 2011, Committee staff met with representatives of European Embassies to discuss support for Operation Unified Protector and the Transitional National Council of Libya.

On May 5, 2011, the Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia held a hearing on “Shifting Sands: Political Transitions in the Middle East, Part II” that addressed the situation in Libya and U.S. involvement, with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

On May 11, 2011, the full Committee considered H. Res. 209, pursuant to notice, in open session, and agreed to a motion to report the resolution favorably to the House by unanimous consent.

Also on May 11, 2011, Committee staff met with representatives from the Department of State and Department of Treasury to review a legislative proposal to enable the Administration to “vest”, or seize a portion of Libyan assets in the jurisdiction of the United States for the purposes of providing humanitarian relief in Libya, which prompted requests for additional information which are still pending.

On May 19, 2011, Committee staff met with Mr. Kerim Uras, Deputy Director General at the North Eastern Mediterranean Bureau of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss Turkey’s support for Operation Unified Protector and the Transitional National Council of Libya.

On May 25, 2011, the full Committee held a hearing entitled, “War Powers, United States Operations in Libya, and Related Legislation” where Members reviewed and considered proposals by Representatives Amash, Gibson, and Rooney relating to Libya and War Powers.

On May 26, 2011, the full Committee hosted a House-wide briefing for Members on “War Powers and the United States Operations in Libya,” with noted legal experts on those issues.

On June 1, 2011, the full Committee will host a classified Members briefing on the situation in Libya with representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and intelligence community.

Also on June 1, 2011, the House of Representatives will consider H.Con.Res. 51, introduced by Representative Kucinich, directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces from Libya.

### TALKING POINTS

1. What day is today?  
Today is day 73.
  
2. What is a President required to do under the War Powers Resolution?
  - (1) Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution requires the President to report to Congress within 48 hours of commencing operations by U.S. forces when there has been no declaration of war.
    - On March 21st, 48 hours after U.S. Armed forces engaged in military operations, the President submitted a letter/report to Congress to justify the use of force in Libya.
  
  - (2) Section 5(b) then states that the President shall terminate these operations within 60 days following the report to Congress, unless the use of force is authorized by Congress.
    - On May 20th, concurrent with the 60-day limitation in the War Powers Resolution, the President submitted a letter to Congress providing an update on the status and nature of U.S. military involvement in Libya and urging adoption of a Senate resolution expressing support for military operations in Libya.
  
  - (3) However, the President can extend the involvement by 30 days if he certifies to Congress that it is necessary to safely remove U.S. forces.
  
3. Is the President in violation of the War Powers Resolution?  
Has the President done an abysmal job of explaining U.S. national security interests in Libya, in consulting with the Congress, and seeking Congressional support? YES.  
  
However, as the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the War Powers resolution is constitutional and, given that the Constitution divides war power authorities, the President would likely argue that he has not violated War Powers.  
  
Congress has the power to declare war and to raise and support the armed forces (Art. I, Sec. 8), while making the President the Commander in Chief of the armed forces (Art. II, Sec. 2)
  
4. Does the President need Congressional authorization to continue U.S. military engagement regarding Libya?  
There is a range of differing legal opinion about whether the President needs Congressional authorization to continue U.S. military involvement beyond the 60-day deadline for termination under the War Powers Resolution, which occurred on May 20<sup>th</sup>.

5. What can the Congress do to express its will regarding the continuation or termination of Libyan operations?

The clear Constitutional authority that Congress has is the “power of purse.”  
Congress can cut-off funding.

The House passed an amendment offered by Mr. Conyers to the National Defense Authorization Act which prevented funds authorized in the Act from being used to fund ground troops in Libya.

The amendment passed 416-5, and parallels the President’s approach to the Libya situation.



# Committee on Foreign Affairs

CHAIRMAN ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN



## Committee on Foreign Affairs Activities Regarding Libya

- The Committee on Foreign Affairs has exercised due diligence and oversight over the Administration's plans and actions.
- Our Foreign Affairs Committee has held:
  - seven hearings, including a session with Members who have introduced measures on Libya and War Powers testifying;
  - a mark-up of a Resolution of Inquiry;
  - a House-wide classified Members' briefing (originally requested by our Committee);
  - another House-wide classified Members meeting on June 1, 2011
  - a Members roundtable meeting with Ambassadors from NATO countries involved in Libya;
  - weekly interagency staff briefings;
  - four Committee classified Member or staff briefings;
  - and other meetings pertaining to congressional notifications related to Libya.