Afghanistan—a War of Necessity
September 17, 2009
BACKGROUND
Question: Can the war in Afghanistan be won? Answer: Yes, we just learned the lessons of counterinsurgency in Iraq. Our military doesn't have to "reinvent the wheel" in Afghanistan, although our strategy will certainly have to be adapted to the specifics of that country. Some in Congress, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee specifically, have argued for the U.S. to adopt a similar strategy to the unsuccessful one implemented in Iraq during 2005 and 2006. Counterinsurgency requires appropriate levels of forces, as determined by commanders on the ground, in order to protect the local population. This may well include more U.S. troops, Special Forces, air resources, and a larger, more reliable and higher-quality Afghan security force. Question: Is the U.S. presence in Afghanistan the same as that of the Soviet Union? Answer: No. The U.S. and Soviet Union had starkly different goals and objectives in Afghanistan. The U.S., after being attacked on 9/11, toppled the Taliban government in an act of self-defense, and we have never had the goal of subjugating the Afghan people. The Soviet Union, however, was propping up a communist regime on the verge of collapse. The Soviet Union also wanted to use Afghanistan as a satellite state, like those it maintained in Eastern Europe, to project its power south. Finally, the Soviets used brutal tactics against the Afghan people-carpet bombing cities such as Kandahar and planting millions of landmines across the country. Question: Do the Afghan people hate the U.S. and its presence in the country? Answer: No, a majority of Afghans have a favorable opinion of the United States. According to an International Republican Institute poll in July, 62 percent have a positive impression of the U.S. Moreover, 82 percent view the Afghan National Army favorably. This is in comparison to only 19 percent which have a positive impression of the Taliban. Question: What is wrong with an "offshore" strategy? Answer: The U.S. already tried such an "offshore" strategy in Afghanistan-during the 1990s as the region became an al Qaeda stronghold in the run-up to the September 11th terrorist attacks. General Petraeus has noted that "offshore" tactics such as drone and missile attacks alone are largely ineffective in areas, such as Afghanistan, where the Taliban has established sanctuaries. The U.S. has learned that there is no alternative to intensive counterinsurgency operations, which have proven to be successful in Iraq and elsewhere. This effort will require a substantial U.S. troop commitment to protect the population and to enable Afghanistan's democratic government to secure its territory. Question: Would a loss in Afghanistan inspire the enemies of the U.S.? Answer: Yes. The effects of an American military loss or premature withdrawal would be grave. Although the U.S. is present in Afghanistan for quite different reasons than the Soviet Union was and the Afghan people are supportive of our efforts, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan did lay the groundwork for the September 11th attacks by inspiring jihadists with the idea that they could humble a superpower. As the Wall Street Journal's Bret Stephens wrote recently, "Put simply, it was the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that laid much of the imaginative groundwork for 9/11. So imagine the sorts of notions that would take root in the minds of jihadists-and the possibilities that would open up to them-if the U.S. was to withdraw from Afghanistan in its own turn." A U.S. defeat would be another huge political and ideological victory which could be used to recruit a new wave of jihadists. A loss could also lead to a full-blown return of the Taliban, destruction of a fledgling democracy, and an unstable neighbor to Pakistan and other countries in the region. In other words, Afghanistan continues to be key to the war on terrorism and cannot be abandoned. Question: What would be the impact of succeeding in Afghanistan? Answer: The U.S. experience in Iraq proved that the right course is to wage a fully-resourced counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and thus demonstrate our commitment to Afghanistan, and provide strong global leadership against terrorism. As Ambassador Ryan Crocker noted on the impact of the President Bush's Iraq troop surge decision, "In the teeth of ferociously negative popular opinion, in the face of a lot of well-reasoned advice to the contrary, he said he was going forward, not backward," clearly demonstrating to the global community and potential adversaries that the United States is willing to fulfill its overseas commitments. The Iraq troop surge clearly challenged the opinion held by U.S. adversaries that American civilian leadership would not have the stomach to finish tough fights, and a similar decision by a President of a different political party would be a clarion call that the U.S. will defend its interest abroad and honor its commitments, regardless of changes in elected leadership. Question: What message would a U.S. retreat send to our allies in the region and tribal leaders? Answer: A U.S. retreat from Afghanistan would have a negative and destabilizing effect on allies in the region such as Pakistan and India, as well as tribal leaders in Afghanistan. A withdrawal would tempt local tribal leaders to ally themselves with the Taliban as they see the tide turning against the government of Afghanistan, further jeopardizing the nascent democracy. A stable Pakistan and India are also in the national security interest of the U.S. Pakistan is a country of 180 million Muslims, armed with nuclear weapons and besieged by several terrorist groups internally. Recently, Pakistan has made significant strides against insurgent groups in its border regions, specifically in the Swat River Valley. Removing U.S. forces from the Afghan side of the border would endanger these gains.
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